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Abstract
In this paper, we try to understand the nature of the changes to Mexican macroeconomic
policy in the early 1980s using a critical juncture framework. The framework argues that three
elements - crisis, ideational change, and radical policy change - must be identified in order for us
to be able to declare, with some certainty, whether an event constitutes a critical juncture. Utilizing
this framework, we will ascertain if the changes to Mexican macroeconomic policy constituted a
clean break with the past, or were a continuation of previously established policy pathways.
KEYWORDS: Mexico, economic, crisis, critical, juncture, ideas
 Introduction 
 
It is against the background of our current global economic crisis that we examine 
how Mexico responded to its own economic difficulties in the early 1980s.  By 
the late 1970s, on the surface at least, the future looked bright for Mexico.  Its 
economy was growing, it had discovered oil and its government was spending 
large sums on state projects and enterprises.  However, within a few short years 
circumstances changed dramatically, leading to a deep questioning of extant 
macroeconomic policy.  Did policy change?  What form did this change assume? 
And what lessons might policy makers today take from this episode? 
Sudden policy changes are often blamed on crises of a variety of kinds.  
We will see the current global economic crisis held up as responsible for the 
various policy changes that come in its wake. Such crises are regarded as 
affording politicians the chance to implement new strategies in direct response.  
This has resulted in an inclination amongst commentators to readily connect 
economic crises with radical policy changes and deem them to constitute cause 
and effect.  However, here we contend that such linkage is an oversimplification 
of a far more complex process. It fails to take account of the political 
circumstances within individual jurisdictions or the idea that economic crises are 
a necessary, but insufficient, condition for radical policy changes – often such 
crises are followed simply by policy continuity.    
In exploring this issue, we employ the critical juncture framework 
developed by Hogan and Doyle (2007).  According to the framework, a critical 
juncture consists of three discreet, but interconnected, elements: crisis, ideational 
change (extant ideational collapse and new ideational consolidation), and radical 
policy change (see Figure 1).   
   
  Ideational Change     
Crisis 
 
+ 
Extant 
Ideational 
Collapse 
 
+ New Ideational 
Consolidation 
 
+ 
Radical 
Policy 
Change 
 
= Critical 
Juncture 
Figure 1. Critical Juncture Framework 
 
The framework’s underlying hypothesis is that a crisis can create the 
environment where change agents can contest extant ideas and the policies based 
upon them. Replacement of an extant ideational paradigm through the 
consolidation of a new set of ideas – as a consequence of a crisis – results in a 
radical policy change. According to this framework, the differentiating factor 
between crises that result in critical junctures in policies, and those that do not, is 
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 ideational change.  In the absence of ideational change, policy change in response 
to a crisis will either be first or second order policy change, but not third order 
(paradigmatic) change.1 Policy instrument settings, and the instruments 
themselves, may change, but without ideational change the hierarchy of goals 
underpinning a policy will remain unaltered. Ideational change constitutes the 
variable connecting a crisis and the nature of the subsequent policy change. 
Here we will examine whether the economic difficulties affecting Mexico 
at the start of the 1980s constituted a crisis; whether there was a subsequent 
change in the ideas underlying extant macroeconomic policy; and what exactly 
was the nature of the change, if any, to Mexican macroeconomic policy?  
Employing the framework provides us with a glimpse into the black box of policy 
making and the mechanics of policy change. The framework’s robustness means 
it can be applied broadly and in so doing renders the concept of the critical 
juncture less nebulous and case specific.   
 
 
A Brief Overview of the Critical Junctures Literature 
 
According to Hogan and Doyle’s (2007) theory, a critical juncture consists of a 
crisis, ideational change and a radical policy change. “Because the decision to 
select any particular event as the starting point of analysis may seem arbitrary, the 
investigator is prone to keep reaching back in their search for the foundational 
causes” (Mahoney 2000, 527).  The crucial object is one that sets development 
along a particular path, the trigger event (Pierson 2004). Periods of policy genesis 
correspond to critical junctures (Abbott 1997). Mahoney (2001) regards critical 
junctures as responsible for the implementation of a specific policy arrangement 
from among a range of choices. The policy pathway then established works to 
funnel subsequent policies in a particular direction (Pierson and Skocpol 2002). 
Comparative and single case studies of various types of change have 
employed the concept of critical junctures.  For some authors, critical junctures 
are marked by period of swift change, while for others they take place over a 
much longer period.  On the issue of swift change, Garrett and Lange (1995) 
showed how elections could result in critical junctures by producing 
overwhelming mandates for policy change. The concept was used to examine 
transitions from authoritarian regimes by Casper and Taylor (1996), while Hogan 
and Doyle’s (2007) remoulded framework was used to examine changes in 
macroeconomic policy in Sweden and the US in a comparative historical context.  
Critical junctures have also been used to examine the differences between Danish 
politicians’ and citizens’ attitudes towards the European Union (EU) (Flockhart 
                                                 
1
 Here the model borrows from Hall’s (1993) concept of first, second and third order change. 
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 2005). In relation to long term change, Collier and Collier (1991) and Mahoney 
(2001), in their analyses of regime change and trade union movement 
development in Latin and Central America, used critical juncture frameworks.  
For these authors, critical junctures took place over many decades.  Akin to path 
dependence, the critical junctures approach highlights the importance of the past 
in explaining the present. 
 
 
Operationalizing the Critical Junctures Framework 
 
In this paper, we examine changes in Mexican macroeconomic policy in the early 
1980s in three stages, employing a variation upon Hogan and Doyle’s (2007) 
critical juncture framework. Three discrete sets of observable implications are 
developed to test for economic crisis, ideational change, and the nature of policy 
change.  
The existence of a crisis means extant policies cannot be maintained 
without a general worsening of the current situation (Boin et al. 2005). A crisis 
could be a war, a revolution, or an economic catastrophe – anything that produces 
a mandate for policy change. In this case, we will test for an economic crisis, as 
there is a longstanding debate in the literature on the relationship between 
economic crises and policy change (Haggard and Kaufman 1995).  Such an event 
raises serious questions about existing policy, and can unleash powerful forces for 
change in a country that can have a wide-ranging and long lasting impact 
(Haggard 2003).  An economic crisis, therefore, can influence policy preferences 
(Stevenson 2001). 
Ideational change can result in a transformed policy environment, but 
understanding how ideas influence policy making is something theorists have 
long grappled with (Pemberton 2000; Taylor 1993).  To address the question of 
why ideas underlying failing policies sometimes change, resulting in policy 
change, whereas at other times they remain unaltered, we look to Legro’s (2000) 
work on the concepts of extant ideational collapse and new ideational 
consolidation.  
The nature of the subsequent policy change is identified using Hall’s 
(1993) concepts of first, second and third order change.  These orders of policy 
change provide a deeper understanding as to the nuances contained within in the 
policy change process, as well as the kind of change that is necessary for there to 
be a critical juncture.         
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 Identifying a Macroeconomic Crisis 
 
Identifying a macroeconomic crisis is difficult, as it is a rare and often country 
specific event. Nevertheless, even events such as these must be made quantifiable, 
to some extent at least. Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh (2003) suggest examination 
of individual variables when studying a currency crisis. However, Pei and 
Adesnik (2000) and Hogan and Doyle (2007) set out a broad range of 
qualitative/quantitative criteria for identifying a macroeconomic crisis. General 
economic indicators, used in conjunction with perceptions of economic 
performance, can help identify a macroeconomic crisis (Garuba 2006; Kwon 
2001). Thus, economic crises have been previously studied using various 
combinations of subjective and objective criteria. The observable implications 
employed in this analysis draw upon the criteria developed in the works discussed 
above.  
  
The economy may have been in crisis if:   
 
O1. GDP growth was stagnant or negative, 
O2. Debt as a percentage of GNI was above 100 percent, 
O3. Inflation was above 15 percent,  
O4. The interest rate was above 15 percent, 
O5. Unemployment was above 15 percent, 
O6. Opinion polls found the public regarded the economic to be in 
crisis, 
O7. The national media regarded the economy to be in crisis, 
O8. Economic and political commentators regarded the economy 
to in crisis, 
O9. The central bank regarded the economy to be in crisis, 
O10. Domestic and international organisations monitoring 
economic performance regarded the economy to be in 
crisis,  
O11.  Elected representatives regarded the economy to be in crisis, 
and 
O12. Government pronouncements on the economy were 
consistent with a crisis management approach.  
 
Identifying Ideational Change (Collapse and Consolidation)  
 
An economic crisis can result in the questioning of extant economic policy by 
society.  However, the crisis on its own will not dictate the evolution of economic 
policy, this being determined by political and ideational processes responding to 
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 the crisis (Golob 2003).  Blyth (2002) contends that ideas facilitate the building of 
coalitions among agents intent upon resolving a crisis. In this respect, ideas 
constitute the mechanisms of policy change in a critical juncture (Golob 2003).  
Hogan and Doyle’s (2007) framework argues that for a radical change in policy to 
take place, it is necessary that actors consolidate around a particular set of new 
ideas that they have reached consensus upon.  The framework locates ideational 
change at the crossroads of crisis and policy change, determining the type of 
policy change that occurs in response to the crisis.     
 If we want to fully understand policy change, it is necessary to take 
account of the work actors do to produce that change (Zittoun 2009).  Hogan and 
Doyle (2007) argue that three types of change agents are responsible for 
introducing ideas into the policy making environment: outside influencers, policy 
entrepreneurs and political entrepreneurs.  These change agents can act as either 
motors for change or hindrances to change (Hogan and Doyle 2007). In this 
manner, the critical juncture theory formalizes and captures Kleistra and Mayer’s 
(2001) ideas of carriers and barriers to policy change.  Thus, the theory accepts 
Capano’s (2009) contention that stability and change are connected at both 
theoretical and empirical levels. 
Outside influencers consist of various print, electronic and online media, 
and international organisations such as the Organisation for Economic 
cooperation and Development (OECD) and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF).  They often advocate new economic paradigms while critiquing the extant 
ones. Policy entrepreneurs may be academics, economists, commentators, civil 
servants, pressure groups or others. Crucially, policy entrepreneurs tend to seek 
access to policy makers in their effort to have their voices heard (Kingdon 1995). 
The most important group of change agents are what Dahl (1961) calls political 
entrepreneurs. These are the actors, whether in government or the opposition, with 
the capacity to utilise the instability of a crisis and the new ideas put forward by 
outside influencers and policy entrepreneurs in their efforts to bring about policy 
change (Sheingate 2003). The political entrepreneurs introduce new ideas into the 
policy making process.   
  
Ideational Collapse. If change agents agree that the extant ideational paradigm is 
inadequate, and should be replaced, then ideational collapse has occurred.  Extant 
ideational collapse is the first stage in Legro’s (2000) two-stage model of 
ideational change.  The observable implications for identifying ideational collapse 
are: 
 
O1. Media critique the current policy paradigm and propose 
alternative ideas, 
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 O2. International organisations critique the current policy 
paradigm and propose alternative ideas, 
O3. There is widespread public dissatisfaction with the current 
policy paradigm, observable through opinion polls, protests 
etc.,  
O4. Academics, economists and civil servants (policy 
entrepreneurs) critique the current policy paradigm and 
propose alternative ideas, 
O5. Civil society organizations such as the labour unions, 
employer organizations and consumer groups (policy 
entrepreneurs) critique the current policy paradigm and 
propose alternative ideas, and 
O6. Opposition political parties (political entrepreneurs) critique 
the current policy paradigm and propose alternative ideas.  
 
New Ideational Consolidation. Agents must diagnose, and impose on others, their 
notion of a crisis before collective action to resolve the uncertainty can begin 
(Blyth 2002). Once extant ideational collapse has occurred change agents will 
offer solutions. Legro (2000) warns that if they fail to reach consensus on a 
replacement idea, continuity could result, as society has a tendency to re-embrace 
the extant paradigm.  However, if change agents, led by a political entrepreneur, 
reach consensus on a replacement idea, it constitutes the second stage of Lergo’s 
(2000) model – consolidation (Sheingate 2003).  Observable implications include:  
 
O7. Clear alternative ideas developed by policy entrepreneurs, 
O8. Political entrepreneur combines interests to produce consensus 
around replacement paradigm, and 
O9. Political entrepreneur injects new ideas into the policy making 
arena. 
 
Consensus on the new ideas will protect the policies derived from them.  
Continuity results from protected ideas, as institutionally embedded ideas ensure 
that “policy-making becomes possible only in terms of these ideas” (Blyth 2001, 
4). In this manner, the critical juncture theory seeks to address Mintrom and 
Norman’s (2009, 650) question “by what means can advocates of policy change 
come to have broad influence?”   
 
Identifying the Degree of Policy Change  
 
Hogan and Doyle’s (2007) theory argues that once change agents, led by a 
political entrepreneur, consolidate around a new set of policy ideas, radical policy 
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 change should follow. The theory recognises ideas as capable of altering the 
policy environment (McNamara 1998). Ideational change is seen as the 
differentiating factor between crises that result in radical policy change and those 
that do not. 
 To discover if a radical change in policy followed ideational change, we 
use observable implications based upon Hall’s (1993) concepts of first, second, 
and third order policy change. He defines third order changes in policies as radical 
transformations, with first and second order changes being of lesser magnitude.  
These observables will enable us to identify, and differentiate, normal and 
fundamental shifts in macroeconomic policy.  
For Hall (1993), extant paradigms can be discredited by their failures and 
exogenous shocks, leading to a re-examination of extant policy – a paradigmatic 
shift. These observables also incorporate the ideas of swift and enduring change; 
it cannot be a long process of incremental adjustment and it should survive at least 
one change of government – otherwise how can it be a transformative event?  
Capano and Howlett (2009) point out that clarifying when a policy change can be 
regarded as fundamental, and the length of time it takes to observe such a change, 
is usually based on a multi-year perspective to identify actual, as opposed to 
temporary, policy alterations. Selecting swift change, that survives a 
government’s terms of office, addresses the problems of defining and 
operationalizing the timing and scope of policy change (Howlett 2009).   
 The following observable implications indicate that there may have been a 
radical change in economic policy if:  
 
O1.  Economic policy instrument settings changed (swiftly and for 
longer than a government’s term of office),  
O2.  The instruments of economic policy changed (swiftly and for 
longer than a government’s term of office), and  
O3. The hierarchy of goals behind economic policy changed 
(swiftly and for longer than a government’s term of office).  
 
The degree of policy change identified will determine if there has been a critical 
juncture. 
 
Evaluating the Empirical/Theoretical Fit 
 
The criteria of strong evidence (SE), medium evidence (ME), weak evidence 
(WE) and no evidence (NE) will be used here to assess our findings in relation to 
the observable implications. Coding, using predetermined criteria of this nature, is 
designed to ensure that our findings can be arranged and analyzed coherently 
(Maxwell 2005). The more evidence that points towards a crisis, ideational 
change and third order policy change, the more confidence we can have that a 
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 critical juncture occurred. This coding allows for a more nuanced understanding 
of the criteria contributing to a critical juncture. As interpretation of the codes 
employed is crucial in divining meaning from them, the reporting of findings, in 
the interest of clarity, usually involves thick description of the categories and their 
contexts (Geertz 1973; Polgar and Thomas 2008).    
 
 
Examining Changes in Mexico’s Macroeconomic Policy  
 
Using the critical juncture framework as set out above, we can now examine the 
changes to Mexico’s macroeconomic policy in the early 1980s.  In three distinct 
stages we will test for an economic crisis, ideational change and finally the nature 
of the policy change that occurred in Mexico.  This will enable us determine if the 
changes to Mexican macroeconomic policy during this time constituted a critical 
juncture – a sharp break with the past, or were in fact a continuation of previously 
established policies. 
 
Stage 1: Testing for a Macroeconomic Crisis 
 
In an effort to increase Mexico’s international trade, while decreasing its foreign 
dependence, the country adopted an import substitution policy after the Second 
World War (Narula 2002). The development of domestic industries took place 
behind trade barriers (González 2002; Solis 1971). However, as the internal 
market was closed off to foreign competition, competitiveness was not crucial for 
Mexican industries (Hernandez 2010). Despite this, the model appeared 
successful, as there was a strong demand for Mexican raw materials as the global 
economy recovered from the ravages of war. Ultimately though, Mexico’s 
policies created a private sector with a mercantile mentality – dependent upon 
state protection (Hernandez 2010). 
 During the early 1970s a combination of the first oil crisis and economic 
mismanagement by the administration of President Luis Echeverria (1970-1976) 
resulted in a recession (Narula 2002). Increased state spending, in an effort to 
revive the economy, contributed to inflation and resulted in a rapidly rising 
national debt that more than tripled between 1970 and 1976 (Lustig 1992). The 
government’s monetary and fiscal indiscipline marked the end of the policy 
approach known as “stabilising development.” The reality was that Mexico’s 
import substitution economy could not compete with global manufacturers such 
as the United States (US), Japan and West Germany.  At the same time, there was 
growing discontent amongst the middle classes at their inability to influence 
policy making in the country’s single party (Institutional Revolutionary Party 
(PRI)) dominated culture (Rubio 2009). 
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  President José López Portillo (1976-1982) came to power facing 
significant economic challenges (Alarcon and McKinley 1992).  He was not long 
in office when the state owned oil giant Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) 
discovered vast reserves under the country’s northern states (Calderón-Madrid 
1997).  Thereafter, the expectation was that future oil revenues would resolve the 
problems in the economy.  However, this development permitted extant economic 
policies to endure, despite increasing evidence of their failures.  In the end, the oil 
boom proved temporary, serving only to delay the day of reckoning when the 
structural problems in the economy would have to be addressed (Nelson 1990).  
This is an example the quick fixes often sought by the Mexican political elite, and 
by presidents who, permitted only one term of office, did not have to worry about 
the prospect of facing angry voters in a re-election campaign (Tournaud 2008). 
As Mexico’s development strategy came to depend upon oil revenues, 
demands increased for more public spending.  The government’s response was to 
increase the number of state owned enterprises by 400 percent (Calderón-Madrid 
1997; Clavijo and Valdivieso 2000).  As a consequence, state expenditures came 
to outpaced petroleum revenues and government’s tax income (Solís 1981).  The 
rate of inflation rose sharply in the early 1980s as a result of this spending (see 
Table 1). At the same time, the value of the peso rose, reducing the competiveness 
of exports, apart from oil (McCaughan 1993). This was to have detrimental 
consequences for the trade balance (Nash 1991).   
By the early 1980s, oil prices fell in response to the diminished demand 
following the oil crises of the 1970s, a weakening global economy and a resultant 
supply glut (Hershey Jr. 1981). The Mexican economy, with its enduring 
structural problems, proved incapable of weathering the challenges presented by 
this combination of circumstances.  In 1981, PEMEX and the Secretaría de 
Programación y Presupuesto (SPP) reported that oil production would not be 
sufficient to revive the economy. Foreign borrowing became necessary to sustain 
economic expansion. By 1981 Mexico had borrowed $78 billion to fill the chasm 
between revenues and expenditures (Alarcon and McKinley 1992).  However, as 
interest rates increased in the recessionary US, the money supply to Mexico 
diminished, while demand for Mexican goods also declined. The higher US 
interest rates also placed increased pressure on Mexico’s debt servicing, as US 
banks had lent the country some $25 billion. By 1982, the cost of servicing 
Mexico’s debt surpassed its oil revenues (Cornelius 1985). The combination of 
economic mismanagement, falling oil prices and higher interest rates obliterated 
the benefits the economic growth achieved during the 1970s had bestowed (Starr 
2006). 
Mexicans, having lost confidence in their economy, began converting their 
pesos to dollars throughout 1982 (Sancton, Lopez and Ungeheuer 1982). In an 
effort to stem the flow of capital from the economy, Banco de Mexico permitted 
9
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 the dollar price of the peso to double (Banco de Mexico 1983).  However, the 
problems in the Mexican economy became clear for all to see on 13 August, 1982, 
when:   
 
The government fired the shot heard around the world, announcing 
that it could not meet interest payments coming due within the next 
few days and initiating negotiations for bridge loans and 
rescheduling agreements with the US Treasury, the IMF, and the 
private commercial banks (Nelson 1990, 97).  
 
Table 1. Economic Indicators for Mexico (1972 - 1983) 
Year Unemployment (%) 
Inflation 
(%) 
Interest 
(%) 
Government 
Debt/GNP 
Ratio 
Growth 
Rates in 
Real GDP 
Gross Capital 
Formation (%) of 
GDP 
1972 7 5 N/A 18.5 8.22 20.32 
1973 7.3 12.04 N.A 19.31 7.86 21.39 
1974 7.2 23.75 N/A 19.73 5.78 23.18 
1975 7.2 15.15 11.9 21.17 5.74 23.69 
1976 6.7 15.79 11.8 27.62 4.42 22.29 
1977 8.8 29 12.9 39.18 3.38 22.84 
1978 6.9 17.45 15.1 35.86 8.96 23.6 
1979 5.7 18.17 16.4 32.79 9.69 25.95 
1980 4.2 26.36 20.7 30.53 9.22 25.73 
1981 4.2 27.93 28.6 32.59 8.77 25.94 
1982 6.8 58.92 40.4 53.3 -0.63 21.56 
1983 6.9 101.7 56.7 66.53 -4.2 19.77 
Sources: Data Gob (2011); Fleck and Sorrentino (1994); Mitchell (2007); UNdata (2011) 
 
In 1982, the economic indicators for Mexico pointed towards a crisis 
(Dornbusch and Edwards 1991). As we can see from Table 1, GDP declined by 
0.6 percent in 1982 and a staggering 4.2 percent the following year, while the rate 
of inflation reached 58.92 percent in 1982 and 101.7 percent in 1983.  At the same 
time, interest rates, which had hovered between 30 and 40 percent up to 1981, 
jumped above 50 percent in 1982 and reached a phenomenal 66.53 percent in 
1983. Unemployment jumped towards 7 percent, while more than half the 
workforce, 20 million people, were underemployed (Cornelius 1985). The 
country’s budget deficit had reached an unsustainable 16.5 percent of GDP 
(Russell, Bolte and Lopez 1982, 30). Output was down in all industries; auto 
production declined by a fifth, minerals by a tenth, and agricultural output was 
also down by a fifth (Russell, Bolte and Lopez 1982).  US banks stopped 
providing loans to Mexican companies, as they already owed over $600 million in 
interest (Malkin, Greenwald and Earle 1983).   
10
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  Mexico appeared to be the country most affected by the global downturn 
of the early 1980s (The Economist 1985). In 1983, as unemployment and the 
national debt rose, inflation reached triple digits, and the level of capital formation 
slackened (Table1).  By this point, the country was effectively bankrupt. This was 
to prove Mexico’s worst crisis since the Great Depression (Edwards 1995). El 
País (1983) placed the blame for the disaster on the policies of President Portillo.  
As a consequence, confidence in Mexico’s economy and political elite 
evaporated. Some saw the crisis as evidence that Mexico’s traditional political 
system was decaying (Russell, Bolte and Lopez 1982). 
 Minimum wages could not meet the needs of most Mexican families, as 
the price of basic foodstuffs rose significantly faster (Lustig 1992).  Opinion polls 
revealed a populace gravely worried about their economic future (Basañez 1985).  
In a desperate move to reduce both speculation against the peso and foreign 
investors’ panic, President Portillo opted to nationalise the banks (Warnock 
1995).   
 In an effort to revitalise the export sector, the peso was devalued on two 
occasions in 1982 (Katz 1994). However, the economy could not hold onto a 
sufficient amount of dollars.  To counteract the capital flight, new short term 
loans were taken out, but, together with the peso’s devaluation, ultimately this did 
nothing to resolve the problem (Jiménez 2006). Banco de Mexico’s reserves were 
wiped out in a matter of weeks. Bailey (1988) concludes that the economic 
turmoil occurred due to four concurrent trends: oil price fall/excessive 
government outlays; $15.3 billion in short-term loans which funded capital flight; 
the overvalued peso; and the high level of dollarization in the economy.   
Under Portillo, GDP grew at 8 percent annually from 1978 to 1981, one of 
the highest levels in the world.  However, by the end of 1982 Mexico had run up a 
huge national debt, and drastically devalued its currency. President Portillo’s 
Sixth Annual Presidential Report sums up the situation by remarking that the 
economy was experiencing the worst crisis in its history.2 We can see from Table 
2 that, with findings indicating strong evidence for 10 of the 12 observables, there 
is strong evidence that the Mexican economy was in crisis during the early 1980s. 
  
                                                 
2
 Sixth Annual Presidential Report of President López Portillo, September 1st, 1982. 
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 Table 2. The Identification of Macroeconomic Crisis 
The Observable Implications Mexico 1981-1983 
O1. GDP growth stagnant SE 
O2. Debt as a percentage of GNI was above 100% NE 
O3. Inflation above 15% SE 
O4. Interest rate above 15% SE 
O5. Unemployment above 15% NE 
O6. Opinion polls found the public regarded the economic in crisis SE 
O7. Media regarded the economy in crisis SE 
O8. Economic/political commentators regard the economy in crisis SE 
O9. The central bank regard the economy in crisis SE 
O10. Domestic/ international organisations regard the economy in crisis SE 
O11. Elected representatives regard the economy in crisis SE 
O12. Gov pronouncements consistent with a crisis management approach SE 
Economic Crisis  SE 
 
The general perception amongst politicians, economic commentators, the 
media and the public at large was one of crisis.  The economy was stagnant, 
inflation and interest rates were very high, the national debt, while not over 100 
percent of GNI, was rising rapidly and unemployment, while officially below 10 
percent, masked the far higher level of underemployment in the country. Holding 
with Hogan and Doyle’s (2007) critical juncture framework, which argues that a 
crisis induced consolidation of a new idea – replacing an extant paradigm – will 
lead to significant policy change, the next section will examine whether ideas 
underlying Mexican economic policies changed at this time of economic crisis. 
 
Stage 2: Testing for Ideational Change  
 
PRI presidents traditionally operated populist-redistributive models (Sandersen 
1983). When Portillo assumed office in 1976, he was forced to consider 
expenditure reductions due to the economic downturn following the first oil crisis 
(Woodhead 1980). However, with the discovery of vast oil reserves, he too was 
able to adopt a patronage model that sought to incorporate expansive state 
expenditure with rapid industrialisation (Bailey 1980). Initially, this continuation 
of the populist approach resulted in high growth rates throughout the late 1970s 
(see Table 1), but as the economy grew reliant upon oil revenues it became 
increasingly vulnerable to the vagaries of fluctuating oil prices. 
 
Rather than pay the political price that sweeping redistributive 
policies-especially tax reform-would have entailed, both the 
Echeverria administration (1970-1976) and the Portillo 
12
Submission to Risk, Hazards & Crisis in Public Policy
http://www.psocommons.org/rhcpp
 administration (1976-1982) sought to expand the entire economic 
pie and increase the role of the state in the economy, as banker, 
entrepreneur, and employer (Cornelius 1985, 88). 
 
Ironically, despite the country’s oil revenue, it became increasingly 
dependent on foreign borrowing to meet its expenditure commitments (Prest 
1982). Once oil prices fell and interest rates rose, Mexico faced the prospect of 
defaulting on its debts.  In response, the Portillo administration, in early 1982, 
introduced a 12 point plan to stabilise the economy (Taylor and Lopez 1992).  
The ideas underlying extant economic policy were coming under increasing 
strain.  
The economic crisis dominated the 1982 presidential election. The PRI put 
forward fiscal conservative Miguel De La Madrid as its candidate (Nelson 1990).  
While the mechanics of De La Madrid’s selection were concealed from the 
general public, it appears it resulted from shifts in a more conservative direction 
within the inner circles of the PRI (Sandersen 1983).  The choice of De La Madrid 
constituted a rupture from the party’s revolutionary ideology (Cárdenas 2009).  
With the economy in crisis, and a sense that the PRI and traditional politics were 
failing to meet the challenges confronting the country, free market advocates 
demanded a president who would support the rights of private property (Luna, 
Tirado and Valdes 1987). 
Throughout the campaign, which he ultimately won, De La Madrid 
emphasised the differences between his proposed government and the outgoing 
Portillo administration.  In his inauguration address he declared his opposition to 
populism and institutional corruption (Cornelius 1985). He stressed that a new 
moral, political and economic approach was needed.3 Locked into the 
conditionality of a harsh IMF bailout negotiated by the outgoing administration, 
De La Madrid presented a detailed programme for policy change (Golob 2003).   
The range of options open to the government was limited. External 
financing had dried up in the aftermath of the economic crisis, while oil revenues 
remained stagnant (Hernandez 2010). Even when oil prices began to recover, 
PEMEX did not have the capacity take advantage of the situation. It was clear that 
to maintain economic, political, and social order, a break with the past was 
required.  Acting as a political entrepreneur, De La Madrid championed a new set 
of ideas on how to manage the economy. Change agents, led by De La Madrid, 
consolidated around this replacement set of ideas. These involved moving the 
Mexican economy away from import substitution, towards a more open approach 
to international trade.   
                                                 
3
 First Annual Presidential Report of President Miguel De La Madrid, 1 September, 1983. 
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 We can see from Table 3 that, with strong evidence for the existence of all 
observable implications, an ideational change followed Mexico’s macroeconomic 
crisis. The ideas underlying extant macroeconomic policy, focused on import 
substitution industrialisation, had collapsed. Vast public expenditure by a populist 
president, based on the belief that oil revenues could sustain rapid 
industrialisation, led the country to the brink of bankruptcy. Research in the 1990s 
showed that states with abundant resource wealth ironically tend to perform less 
well economically than their resource hungry counterparts (Karl 1997; Ross 
1999).   
 
Table 3. The Identification of Ideational Change 
The Observable Implications Mexico 1981-1983 
Ideational Collapse 
O1. Media critique the current policy paradigm and propose alternative ideas SE 
O2. International organisations critique the current policy paradigm and propose 
alternative ideas SE 
O3. There is widespread public dissatisfaction with the current policy paradigm, 
observable through opinion polls, protests etc. SE 
O4. Academics, economists and civil servants critique the current policy 
paradigm and propose alternative ideas SE 
O5. Civil society organizations such as the labour unions, employer 
organizations and consumer groups critique the current policy paradigm and 
propose alternative ideas 
SE 
O6. Opposition political parties critique the current policy paradigm and propose 
alternative ideas SE 
New Ideational Consolidation 
O7. Clear alternative ideas developed by policy entrepreneurs SE 
O8. Political entrepreneur combines interests to produce consensus around 
replacement paradigm SE 
O9. Political entrepreneur injects new ideas into the policy making arena SE 
Adoption of New Idea SE 
 
Stage 3: Testing the Nature of Policy Change 
 
On assuming office, De La Madrid adopted a crisis management approach to the 
economy, declaring “we are in an emergency” in his inaugural address at the end 
of 1982 (Russell, Bolte and Lopez 1982, 30).  He quickly set out a 10 point 
program of austerity measures – Programa Inmediato de Reordenacion 
Economica (Program of Immediate Economic Reorganization) (Lustig1998).  
Acting as a political entrepreneur, he appointed 11 new ministers from the 
conservative wing of the PRI (Nelson 1990). Consequently, his cabinet supported 
his measures to stabilize and open the economy – prioritising the attraction of 
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 foreign direct investment (FDI) and focusing on high tech industries (Aboites 
1983; Lustig 1992). Macroeconomic stabilisation became the government’s 
priority (Cornelius 1985; Pastor and Wise 1997). The first budget he sent to 
Congress, seeking to reduce the budget deficit by 50 percent, was draconian 
(Russell, Bolte and Lopez 1982). But, he intended to continue as he had begun 
and the budgets introduced in 1983 and 1984 represented a sustained austerity 
drive (Cornelius 1985). Under De La Madrid, economic policy lurched violently 
to the right. As access to the president was crucial in influencing policy, policy 
entrepreneurs cultivated teams of loyal followers within various bureaucracies 
and departments of government (Golob 2003). 
The peso was pegged at a more "realistic" exchange rate and plans were 
introduced to restructure the federal bureaucracy. De La Madrid introduced 
conventional monetary and fiscal austerity, and more extensive trade 
liberalisation. For decades free trade had been “the policy option that dare not 
speak its name” (Golob 2003, 370).  The Mexican government also adopted a less 
confrontational approach to the IMF and as a result was able to reach agreement 
with the Fund on an adjustment program to revive the economy (Nelson 1990).  
This agreement was hailed as a major break-through, allowing the country to 
avoid a debt moratorium (ISG 1982; Looney 1985). 
 Recognising that the Mexican government and economy could not rely on 
revenues from oil exports, De La Madrid saw the solution to financing the 
country’s development in the privatisation of public enterprises, 1,155 of which 
were sold off (Hernandez 2010). There was an effort to combine structural change 
and macroeconomic stabilisation, with a focus on export orientated industries 
(Cornelius 1985). Power was also decentralised to the 31 states to foster 
competition between their governments and economies, and in so doing help 
encourage the development of private industries and investment. The overall 
objective was the integration of the Mexican economy into the global economy.   
These policies were to have a long lasting impact upon Mexico’s 
economic, and social, development (Cornelius 1985). The change from 
“stabilising development” to neo-liberalism – marked by the government’s 
embrace of liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation – was radical (Pastor and 
Wise 1997). Mexico’s import substitutions policies had concentrated on 
developing the internal market, while the new approach focused on international 
forces as drivers of liberalisation (Middlebrook 2004).  However, a major concern 
was the inability of Mexican industries to compete in foreign markets, and the low 
level of internal saving available to finance growth. The relaxation of restrictive 
FDI laws was a clear signal of the government’s desire to attract foreign 
industries to Mexico. In early 1984 new guidelines were issued specifying the 
conditions under which majority foreign ownership of companies could be 
permitted (Cornelius 1985). This development allowed Mexican businesses to 
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 begin forging relationships with foreign firms Tournaud (2008). All of these 
reforms and cutbacks enabled Mexico reach its IMF targets for reducing the 
public sector deficit and limiting new public sector external indebtedness.  
Unfortunately, the recessionary impact of this strategy was very severe and much 
of the work of economic adjustment was left to De La Madrid's successor (Pastor 
and Wise 1997).   
 The result of these neo-liberal reforms was a transformation in the 
relationship between state and private sector of the economy (Middlebrook 2004).  
For decades the PRI had kept private sector interests at a distance, but now all that 
changed (Golob 2003). As the development of the private sector became crucial 
to the country’s economic revival, the growing importance of the private sector 
gave it more influence over the formulation of economic policy and increased 
access to the government. Under De La Madrid, all sections of society gained a 
voice in a general movement of national liberalisation (Cárdenas 2009). The De 
La Madrid administration recognised that economic revival had to be based upon 
economic reality. 
Mexican economic history can be divided into that which came before, 
and that which came after, 1982 (Serra-Puche 2008). The crisis saw the 
development of a new set of economic policies and a new approach to economic 
management under De La Madrid.  In the wake of the crisis, and the change in the 
ideas underlying economic policy, Mexico experienced a third-order change in 
macroeconomic policy. State control was replaced by the market, public 
ownership was replaced by private ownership and protectionism was replaced by 
competition (Lustig 2001; Pastor and Wise 1997).  From 1982 onwards Mexican 
economic policy started down a different path, culminating in its accession to 
NAFTA in 1993 (Hernandez 2010). Table 4 shows that there is strong evidence 
Mexico’s macroeconomic policy’s instruments settings, the instruments 
themselves, and hierarchy of goals behind macroeconomic policy all changed 
after 1982.   
 
Table 4. The Identification of Change in Government Economic Policy 
The Observable Implications  Mexico 1981-1983  
O1.  Economic policy instrument settings changed  SE 
O2.  The instruments of economic policy changed  SE 
O3.  The hierarchy of goals behind economic policy changed  SE 
Critical Juncture in Macroeconomic Policy SE 
 
According to Hogan and Doyle’s (2007) critical juncture framework, this 
third order policy change, occurring in the wake of an economic crisis and 
ideational change, constitutes a critical juncture. These findings, by highlighting 
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 that an economic crisis is a necessary, but insufficient, condition for radical policy 
change, show the important role ideational change plays in the process of policy 
change. The strength of the ideas underlying the import substitution policy 
protected it and ensured its continuity in the years after 1945. However, by the 
early 1980s, the policy was found to be failing, and the ideas supporting it were 
undermined and collapsed. Thereafter, change agents, led by a political 
entrepreneur in the form of President De La Madrid, consolidated around neo-
liberal ideas on how to manage the economy, resulting in a third-order change in 
Mexican macroeconomic policy.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper examined the economic difficulties in Mexico in the early 1980s in 
order to determine if there had been a critical juncture in that country’s economic 
policies.  To answer this question we employed Hogan and Doyle’s (2007) three 
stage critical junctures theory with its attendant range of observable implications.  
Using this policy change tool, we found strong evidence that the economic 
malaise in Mexico (1981-1983) constituted an economic crisis. With the 
economic viability of the state being questioned, import substitution and the 
restrictions imposed upon FDI were perceived as failing policies. There is strong 
evidence that the ideational foundations underlying extant economic policy 
collapsed in the midst of the economic crisis.  In response, change agents, led by a 
political entrepreneur in the form of President De La Madrid, consolidated around 
new set of ideas on how the manage the economy. These new ideas, involving a 
180 degree reversal of previous policy thinking – opening the economy to free 
trade and pursuing FDI – constituted ideational change. The evidence from our 
findings suggests that the policies adopted in response to the crisis involved 
altering the setting, instruments, and hierarchy of goals behind Mexican economic 
policy – a third order policy change. Thus, we identified a crisis, ideational 
change, and radical change in macroeconomic policy, which according to the 
framework constitutes a critical juncture.   
The early 1980s witnessed a dramatic shift in Mexican macroeconomic 
policy. These policy changes, instituted by De La Madrid, were to serve as a 
cornerstone for Mexican economic policy going forward. Mexico was 
transformed from an inward to an outward looking economy, with a new outlook 
on the world.  This was to ultimately lead Mexico to reappraise its position both 
locally and globally and in just over a decade see it join the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Since the early 1980s, and despite subsequent 
economic crises, this overarching policy prescription has remained unaltered due 
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 to the recognition that protectionism did not work for Mexico and does not 
constitute a viable alternative to a free market and free trade. 
The critical juncture theory shows how established policies are protected 
by the coherence of their underpinning ideas. However, during a crisis, 
established policies and their underpinning ideas, having been weakened by 
failure, can be overcome by political-entrepreneur-led change agents 
consolidating around new ideas.  In the critical junctures theory, the presence or 
absence of ideational change differentiates between a crisis that is followed by a 
radical policy change and one that is followed by policy changes of a less 
dramatic nature. This is a theory capable of examining a range of policy change 
issues and exploring the nature of that change in the wake of a crisis.  As such, the 
observables used here can easily be modified to examine changes in policies as 
diverse as foreign policy, education policy and equality policy.  The critical 
juncture theory can help us to understand the impact of crises on policy making 
and policy change.     
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